Positive political theory

Not to be confused with Positivism.

Positive political theory (PPT), explanatory political theory, or formal theory is the study of politics using formal methods such as social choice theory, game theory, and statistical analysis. In particular, social choice theoretic methods are often used to describe and (axiomatically) analyze the performance of rules or institutions. The outcomes of the rules or institutions described are then analyzed by game theory, where the individuals/parties/nations involved in a given interaction are modeled as rational agents playing a game, guided by self-interest. Based on this assumption, the outcome of the interactions can be predicted as an equilibrium of the game.

The founder of the field was William H. Riker. In his book The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962), he applied the principles of game theory to the study of politics. The original creation of PPT was developed while Riker was the leader of Rochester School of Political Science, generating the Rochester School movement.

Positive political theory has been used to study democratic institutions such as political bargaining. PPT allows researchers to determine how outcomes of political bargaining differ based on whether political actors are equals or if power is unevenly distributed. PPT also permits the identification of institutional and contextual mechanisms that give some group members additional influence in determining collective outcomes. By focusing on the mechanisms, PPT also allows researchers to determine if outcomes are a result of asymmetric bargaining or deliberative persuasion.

See also

• Elite theory
• Iron law of oligarchy
• Public choice theory
• Rational choice theory
• Social choice theory
• Voting systems
• William H. Riker

References

• Austen-Smith, D.; Banks, J. S. (1998). "Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory" (PDF). Annual Review of Political Science. 1: 259–287. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.259.
• Austen-Smith, D.; Banks, J. S. (1999). Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0-472-08721-5.
• Ferejohn, J. (1995). "Law, Legislation, and Positive Political Theory". Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions. Cambridge University Press. pp. 191–215. ISBN 0-521-47810-3.
• Macey, J. R. (1992). "Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies". Georgetown Law Journal. 80 (3): 671–704.
• Riker, W. H.; Ordeshook, P. C. (1973). An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. ISBN 0-13-493064-9.
• Spiller, P. T. (1996). "A Positive Political Theory of Regulatory Instruments: Contracts, Administrative Law or Regulatory". Southern California Law Review. 69 (2): 477–516.

External links

• Google scholar article list
• The origins of positive political theory
• NAS memoir of William H. Riker with discussion of his contributions